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METATAGS AND SPONSORED LINKS: SOLVING
A TRADEMARK DISPUTE WITH AN
ANTITRUST INQUIRY
"Intellectual property rights do not confer a privilege to violate the
antitrust laws. "1
INTRODUCTION
The Internet has drastically altered traditional notions of commer-
cial business, and the recent dawning of e-commerce has led to record
profits.2 While companies maximize profits through online sales,3 the
most jaw-dropping profits reside in the pockets of search engines. 4 As
recently as December 31, 2007, the most popular search engine
boasted earnings of more than $16 billion.5 Not surprisingly, the rise
of previously unheard-of profits has spawned heated litigation.6 In
particular, the appropriate application of trademark laws to e-com-
merce has created a veritable battle royale among the circuit courts. 7
These trademark disputes typically concern the proper use of search
engines, which are online tools that enable Internet users to quickly
find a specific product.8
1. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
2. See Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Lanham Act Trademark Infringement Actions in
Internet and Website Context, 197 A.L.R. FED. 17, 31 (2004) (stating that the Internet has revolu-
tionized commercial business); see also J. Patrick Norris, The Sale of Internet Keywords: Trade-
mark Infringement Actionable Under the Lanham Act?, 2 CHARLESTON L. REv. 889, 889-90
(2008). Norris explains,
[T]he Internet has effected innumerable changes in our everyday lives. None of these
changes, however, are as glaring as the dramatic shift that has taken place in the way
we conduct business. Internet commerce (or "e-commerce") allows merchants and
consumers greater access to the marketplace than ever before. Transaction costs are
lower. Communication is easier.
3. See Nicholas D. Birck, Unlocking the Future with Digital Infrastructure and Wireless Tech-
nology: How Municipal Wireless Networks Equal Good Urban Planning, 58 SYRACUSE L. REV.
613, 629-30 (2008) (explaining the extremely profitable nature of the Internet).
4. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n Form 10-K, http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/
000119312508032690/dl0k.htm#tx96453_3 (2007) [hereinafter Google Form].
5. Id.; see also Chris Colyer, Comment, Searching for a Solution: The Lanham Act's "Use in
Commerce" Requirement in Search Engine Keyword Advertising Cases, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 679,
679 (stating that sponsored links represent "more than 40% of all Internet advertising").
6. See infra notes 63-97 and accompanying text.
7. See id.
8. See id.; Greg Lastowka, Google's Law, 73 BROOK. L. REv. 1327, 1327 (2008) (explaining
that "Google has become ... the index of choice for online information").
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To use a search engine, the Internet user simply types a word or
phrase into the engine. 9 The engine will then comb through millions
of websites in search of potentially relevant information related to the
Internet user's word or phrase.10 The engine usually indentifies rele-
vant information by searching through text on websites, domain
names, or metatags;11 as explained below, metatags are words that a
website owner uses in order to identify the contents of his website. 12
Although the search engine will often produce results that span many
pages in length, 13 Internet users generally click on links that appear on
either the first or second page.14 Consequently, companies aggres-
sively compete to ensure that links to their websites appear at the top
of the result pages. 15 For example, a company may place its rival's
trademark in metatags, in the hopes that a link to its website will ap-
pear on a search engine's result pages every time an Internet user
searches for the rival's website.a6 In response to this tactic, some
search engines no longer search through metatags.17 Yet savvy com-
petitors possess another alternative: purchasing a rival's trademark as
a sponsored link.' 8 Sponsored links are sold by search engines, and
they guarantee that every search for a purchased keyword will cause
the purchaser's website to appear at the top of the result pages, usu-
ally in a distinctly identified sponsored link list. 19 Thus, by purchasing
a rival's trademark as a sponsored link, a competitor ensures that its
9. See Norris, supra note 2, at 898.
10. See id. at 898-99 (explaining how search engines use an algorithm to comb through
websites).
11. See Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1045 (9th Cir.
1999).
12. See infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., 2003 WL 21464568, at *1-2 (W.D. Okla.
May 27, 2003) (explaining how a suit against Google Technology was filed after Search King
started to appear many pages after the first result page).
14. Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 507,
535 (2005) ("Searchers do not generally look at search results beyond the first page or two,
which is a result consistent with bounded rationality.").
15. See Norris, supra note 2, at 899; see also Goldman, supra note 14, at 535-36 (describing
this reality as an "arms race" between search engines and website owners).
16. See Lastowka, supra note 8, at 1372 (explaining that metatags are used by Web page au-
thors to identify the terms that are most relevant to the Web page).
17. See Goldman, supra note 14, at 536 (explaining that search engines constantly update their
algorithms in order to prevent web page designers from successfully exploiting an algorithm's
form).
18. See Lastowka, supra note 8, at 1371-72; Norris, supra note 2, at 899 ("[A] merchant might
place a bid on a mark owned by a competitor with an established reputation in that market in
order to obtain priority placement for his website link in search results.").
19. Norris, supra note 2, at 898-99; see also Lastowka, supra note 8, at 1343 (explaining that
sponsored links usually appear in a separate, clearly marked category of results on the first result
page).
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own website will be displayed at the top of the results even when an
Internet user searches for its rival. This practice leads to the question
of whether a competitor's use of its rival's trademark in metatags and
sponsored links violates trademark laws, as codified in the Lanham
Act.20
The majority of federal circuit courts that have addressed this issue
(occasionally referred to in this Comment as the "majority") have
held that the use of a rival's trademark in metatags and sponsored
links violates the Lanham Act.21 To remedy these violations, the ma-
jority frequently grants injunctions. 22 This Comment argues that the
majority's reasoning is flawed because it focuses on the trademark's
value as an instrument that restricts competition, while it fails to in-
quire whether the restriction is excessively restrictive, in contravention
of antitrust laws and principles.2 3 The failure of the majority to pur-
sue an antitrust inquiry ignores the reality that trademark and anti-
trust laws are intrinsically linked: while trademark laws restrain trade
to promote competition, antitrust laws prohibit overly restrictive re-
straints on trade that harm competition.24 This Comment explores an
inquiry into both trademark and antitrust laws, and it concludes that
the majority has promulgated an inaccurate interpretation of trade-
mark law that threatens to undermine competition on the Internet. 25
Part II begins by briefly defining the relevant technological terms
used throughout this Comment.26 Part 1I then explores the statutes
and opinions governing trademark law, and it concludes by outlining
the traditional interpretations of antitrust laws. 27 Part III highlights
20. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1127; Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d
1036, 1041 (9th Cir. 1999); Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 393, 395-96
(N.D.N.Y. 2006); Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 402, 410
(S.D.N.Y. 2006).
21. See N. Am. Med. Co. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1218-19 (11th Cir. 2008);
Austl. Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228, 1239-42 (10th Cir. 2006); Playboy Enters., Inc. v.
Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1023-24 (9th Cir. 2004); Promatek Indus., Ltd. v.
Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 812-13 (7th Cir. 2002); Hysitron Inc. v. MTS Sys. Co., No. 07-
01533, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58378, at *7-8 (D. Minn. Aug. 1, 2008); Gov't Employees Ins. Co.
v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 703-04 (D. Va. 2004).
22. See Boston Duck Tours v. Super Duck Tours, 531 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2008); N. Am. Med.
Co. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2008); Austl. Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield,
436 F.3d 1228, 1242 (10th Cir. 2006); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354
F.3d 1020, 1023 (9th Cir. 2004); Promatek Indus., Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 814 (7th
Cir. 2002); Hysitron Inc. v. MTS Sys. Co., No. 07-01533, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58378, at *7-8
(D. Minn. Aug. 1, 2008).
23. See infra notes 213-280 and accompanying text.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See infra notes 34-53 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 54-118 and accompanying text.
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the flawed reasoning of the majority of circuits, 28 and it suggests that
the majority's injunctive remedy resembles an anticompetitive exclu-
sive dealing contract. 29 Part IV discusses the impact of the majority's
approach upon the functionality of the Internet, the current scope and
applicability of trademark law, and the appropriate boundaries of an-
titrust laws. 30
II. BACKGROUND
To correctly determine the appropriate application of trademark
and antitrust laws to the Internet, an elementary understanding of
technological definitions is crucial. Therefore, Section A begins with a
brief description of technological terms related to e-commerce. 31 Fol-
lowing these definitions, Section B outlines the relevant elements of
trademark law, as well as the manner in which trademark law has
been applied to search engine activity.32 Finally, Section C discusses
the antitrust laws that should have influenced the majority's interpre-
tation of trademark regulations. 33
A. Technological Definitions Related to E-Commerce
"The Internet is a global network of interconnected computers
which allows individuals and organizations ... to share information
.... The fastest growing part of the Internet is the Web, which is
comprised of countless Web pages from around the world.35 Web
pages, also known as websites, 36 "contain information such as text,
pictures, sounds, audio and video recordings, and links to other web
pages. ' 37 In order to access websites, individuals must use an Internet
browser, such as Microsoft's Internet Explorer, Netscape's Navigator,
and Mozilla's Firefox.38
To locate a particular website, Internet users can either seek the
assistance of a search engine or attempt to accurately guess the do-
28. See infra notes 119-212 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 213-280 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 281-311 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 34-53 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 54-95 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 96-118 and accompanying text.
34. Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1044 (9th Cir. 1999).
35. Id. at 1044. For more information about each of these browsers, see http://www.microsoft.
com/windows[Internet-explorer/default.aspx; http://browser.netscape.com; http://www.mozilla.
com/en-us/firefox/personal.html.
36. See Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1043 (using interchangeably the terms "web-
site" and "Web page").
37. Id. at 1044.
38. Id.
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main name of the website.39 A domain name, similar to a home tele-
phone number, is a unique address that takes an Internet user directly
to the website.40 However, because guessing the exact domain name
of a website may be difficult, search engines have become indispen-
sible online tools.41
The most frequently used search engine is Google,42 and other pop-
ular search engines include Yahoo!, Altavista, MSN, and Lycos.43 To
use a search engine, Internet users type a keyword into the engine.44
The engine then engages in two different search methods to compile
one complete list of relevant search results.45 First, the engine em-
ploys an algorithm to determine which websites are the most rele-
vant. 46 Algorithms are complex, constantly updated, and never
released to the public. 47 In the past, algorithms frequently searched
through metatags,48 which are words that the website owner uses to
describe the contents of a website.49 However, as website owners be-
gan manipulating metatags in order to appear at the top of the result
pages, the algorithms have become more sophisticated and less reliant
upon metatags.5 0 Second, the search engine compiles a list of search
results by placing all sponsored links at the top of the first result
page.51 Sponsored links are sold by the company that runs the search
engine, and they guarantee that a link to the purchaser's website will
39. Buckman, supra note 2, at 32-33.
40. Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1044.
41. See Buckman, supra note 2, at 32-33.
42. See Lastowka, supra note 8, at 1327 (citing Who's Afraid of Google?, ECONOMIST, Aug. 30,
2007).
43. Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1045; see also Mathew Sag, Copyright and Copy-
Reliant Technology, 103 Nw. U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2009) (stating that Google, Yahoo, and
MSN are the three most popular search engines today).
44. Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1045.
45. Norris, supra note 2, at 898-99.
46. Id.
47. Goldman, supra note 14, at 534-36 (explaining that search engines update algorithms in
order to prevent web page designers from exploiting an algorithm's form).
48. Historically, algorithms search for the keyword in domain names, metatags, and text on
websites. See Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1045. The more often the keyword ap-
pears in the domain name, metatags, and text, the more likely it is that a link to the website will
appear at the top of the result pages. Id.
49. Two types of metatags exist: description metatags and keyword metatags. Description
metatags describe the website, and keyword metatags contain words "that relate to the content
of the web site." Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1045.
50. Consequently, changing metatags to match the qualities of an algorithm is frequently un-
successful, or, at best, only temporarily successful. See Lastowka, supra note 8, at 1371-72 (ex-
plaining that in the past, competitors placed their rival's trademark in their metatags; now,
however, the sophistication of algorithms has rendered the use of metatags less prevalent).
51. See Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 402, 408 & n.4
(S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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appear on the first result page every time an Internet user types the
purchased keyword into the engine.52 Usually, sponsored links are
visually separated from the list of non-sponsored, "organic" links.5 3
The foregoing definitions demonstrate the truly unique qualities of
e-commerce, which vary in great degree from conventional, non-vir-
tual commerce. However, prior to discussing the proper application
of trademark and antitrust laws to this unique forum, the remainder of
this Part will briefly outline the well-settled, traditional interpretations
of trademark and antitrust laws.
B. Traditional Trademark Law Applied to Offline Activity
The proper use of trademarks is governed by the Lanham Act,
which aims to preserve the clarity of trademarks, protect consumers
against confusion, reduce consumer search costs, and encourage
trademark owners to make investments in quality and reputation.5 4
To accomplish its purposes, the Act prohibits the "use in commerce
... of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale,
distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connec-
tion with which such use is likely to cause confusion. '55 Because par-
ties rarely dispute whether search engines are engaged in interstate
commerce, this Comment will focus on the use and confusion ele-
ments of the Lanham Act.56
The traditional, offline definitions of "use" and "confusion" are
well-settled. The Lanham Act explains that trademarks are "used" in
connection with goods when the trademark "is placed in any manner
on the goods or their containers or the displays associated therewith
or on the tags or labels affixed thereto. '57 Courts interpret "confu-
52. See Southern Grouts & Mortars, Inc. v. 3M Co., 575 F.3d 1235, 1240 (11th Cir. 2009).
53. Lastowka, supra note 8, at 1343 (describing that Google might award its sponsored links a
spot on the left side of the page, above its organic links).
54. Michael Grynberg, Trademark Litigation as Consumer Conflict, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 60,
64-66 (2008); see infra notes 63-95 and accompanying text.
55. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2006). For a discussion about the Lanham Act's goals, see Hung
P. Chang, Return to Confusion: Call for Abandonment of the Initial Interest Confusion Doctrine,
12 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 131, 133 (2008); see also infra notes 187-212 and accompanying text
(discussing how the majority adheres to a holding that is inconsistent with the purpose of trade-
mark law).
56. When this issue is disputed, courts have found that the use is "in commerce." See, e.g.,
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1032 (9th Cir. 2004). For a
discussion of the issues typically disputed in the search engine context, see infra notes 63-95 and
accompanying text. Furthermore, it is noted that a violation of the Lanham Act consists of six
elements, as seen in 1-800 Contacts; however, the elements not expressly mentioned by this
Comment are ignored simply because they are rarely disputed. See 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v.
WhenUcom, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 407 (2d Cir. 2005).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
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sion" as a "likelihood of confusion. '58 For the purpose of trademark
infringement, a likelihood of confusion requires that "an appreciable
number of ordinarily prudent purchasers are likely to be misled, or
indeed simply confused, as to the source of the goods in question. '59
Therefore, a likelihood of confusion refers to a likelihood of confusion
at the time of purchase. In order to distinguish this type of confusion
from other types of confusion, this Comment will occasionally refer to
the definition of "likelihood of confusion" as "likelihood of actual
confusion."
Although traditional definitions of "use" and "confusion" are well
developed,60 the recent growth of the Internet has created controversy
where none previously existed. 61 In particular, the appropriate inter-
pretation of online "use" and online "confusion" remain unsettled. 62
C. The Majority Holds That the Use of Trademarks in Metatags
and Sponsored Links Violates the Lanham Act
The Internet has become a new and important mechanism for com-
merce.63 While competitors "stake out their places in cyberspace," ri-
vals turn to litigation in order to gain online advantages. 64 The rise in
litigation related to online activity has led to inconsistent decisions
among the circuit courts.65 Specifically, turmoil surrounds the issue of
whether a competitor violates trademark laws when it uses a rival's
trademark in metatags and sponsored links. 66 The following discus-
sion surveys the conflicting resolutions of this issue.
58. Id.; see, e.g., Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 580 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1978).
This Comment will refer to the textual definition of confusion as "actual confusion." In order to
be actually confused, the consumer must be confused as to the source of the good in question at
the time of purchase.
59. Mushroom Makers, Inc., 580 F.2d at 47; see also John Kimpflen, Trademarks and
Tradenames, 74 Am. JUR. 2D Trademarks and Tradenames § 86 (2008) (stating that a likelihood
of confusion exists "when a large number of purchasers likely will be confused as to the source of
the goods in question").
60. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 29-30 & nn.3-4 (de-
fining "use" under the Lanham Act).
61. See infra notes 63-95 and accompanying text.
62. Id.
63. Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1044 (9th Cir. 1999).
64. See id. (describing how companies have reacted to the rise of e-commerce); see also Col-
yer, supra note 5, at 680 (outlining the "substantial amount of litigation" surrounding the use of
sponsored links).
65. See infra notes 63-95 and accompanying text.
66. Id.
20091
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1. The Majority Rule
Every circuit that has considered the issue now holds that the use of
a competitor's trademark in metatags and sponsored links violates the
Lanham Act. 67 In reaching this conclusion, the majority of circuit
courts do not treat the "use" issue as a threshold inquiry; instead, the
majority focuses on consumer confusion.68
Traditionally, the "confusion" requirement of the Lanham Act is
defined in terms of a consumer's confusion as to the source of the
good. 69 However, the majority does not employ this definition when
applying the Lanham Act to e-commerce.70 Instead, the majority
finds the requisite "confusion" when "initial interest confusion" re-
sults from the trademark's use.71 Thus, these courts diverge from the
traditional definition of confusion in favor of a broader definition that
includes initial interest confusion.
Initial interest confusion occurs on the Internet when consumers be-
lieve that they are clicking on a link to the trademark owner's website,
but upon clicking on that link, they are routed to the website of a rival
67. See, e.g., N. Am. Med. Co. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1212 (11th Cir. 2008);
Austl. Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228, 1241 (10th Cir. 2006); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Net-
scape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1021 (9th Cir. 2004); Promatek Indus., Ltd. v. Equitrac
Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 813 (7th Cit. 2002); Hysitron Inc. v. MTS Sys. Co., No. 07-01533 ADM/AJB,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58378, at *7-8 (D. Minn. Aug. 1, 2008); Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v.
Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 705 (D. Va. 2004); see also Merck & Co., 425 F. Supp. 2d at 415
(stating that "in the search engine context, defendants do not 'place' the ... marks on any goods
or containers or displays or associated documents, nor do they use them in any way to indicate
source or sponsorship").
68. See, e.g., Boston Duck Tours v. Super Duck Tours, 531 F.3d 1, 25-26 (1st Cir. 2008); N.
Am. Med. Co. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1220 (11th Cir. 2008); Austl. Gold, Inc.
v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228, 1238 (10th Cir. 2006); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc'ns
Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cit. 2004); Promatek Indus., Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808,
812 (7th Cir. 2002); Hysitron Inc. v. MITS Sys. Co., No. 07-01533 ADM/AJB, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 58378, at *8-9 (D. Minn. Aug. 1, 2008); Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting,
Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 402, 411; Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 704
(D. Va. 2004). The Second Circuit did not expressly adhere to this reasoning. See Rescuecom
Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 128-30 (2d Cir. 2009) (distinguishing 1-800 Contacts without
actually explaining why the distinguished facts should lead the court to such a different out-
come). Therefore, while both the Second Circuit and the majority of circuits hold that the con-
duct at issue satisfies the "use" element, it remains possible that instead of following the majority
of circuits, the Second Circuit may follow the Third Circuit in holding that the "use" does not
violate the Lanham Act because the "use" does not lead to consumer confusion. See infra notes
90-95 and accompanying text.
69. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1061-65
(9th Cir. 1999).
71. See, e.g., id. at 1064 (arguing that an initial interest confusion amounts to a prima facie
showing of confusion because the use of the trademark allowed the competitor to appropriate
the good will of its rival's trademark).
METATAGS AND SPONSORED LINKS
company. 72 Although the consumers immediately realize their mis-
take, they were initially confused when they clicked on the rival's
link.73 The majority condemns initial interest confusion because some
consumers may realize their mistake, yet remain on the rival's website
because the rival's product is equally, if not more, satisfying. 74 Thus,
under the majority's rationale, the rival has violated the Lanham Act
by using its rival's trademark in a manner that appropriates the good-
will of the trademark owner. 75 After holding that the use of trade-
marks in metatags and sponsored links creates initial interest
confusion, the majority terminates its trademark inquiry. In doing so,
these circuits neglect to engage in a full-fledged inquiry into the statu-
tory definition of either "use" or "confusion. '76
2. The Second Circuit, Prior to Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc.77
Before 2009, the Second Circuit held that the use of a competitor's
trademark in metatags and sponsored links did not violate trademark
law because these uses did not satisfy the statutory definition of
"use."'78 As defined by the Lanham Act, a trademark is "used" in




75. See Brookfield Commc'ns, 174 F.3d at 1062.
76. See, e.g., Boston Duck Tours v. Super Duck Tours, 531 F.3d 1, 30-31 (1st Cir. 2008); N.
Am. Med. Co. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1223-24 (11th Cir. 2008); Austl. Gold,
Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228, 1240 (10th Cir. 2006); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape
Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1033-34 (9th Cir. 2004); Promatek Indus., Ltd. v. Equitrac
Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 813 (7th Cir. 2002); Hysitron Inc. v. MTS Sys. Co., No. 07-01533 ADM/AJB,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58378, at *7-9 (D. Minn. Aug. 1, 2008); Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v.
Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 703-06 (D. Va. 2004).
77. 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that Google "uses" trademarks when it advertises and
sells a company's trademark to that company's rivals), rev'g 456 F. Supp. 2d 393 (N.D.N.Y.
2006).
78. See 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.Com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 403 (2d Cir. 2005). Although
the Second Circuit did not expressly overrule 1-800 Contacts in Rescuecom, the Rescuecom court
effectively overruled 1-800 Contacts by interpreting it in a manner that implicitly re-writes its
reasoning, and by drawing inferences from 1-800 Contacts that were never meant to have been
drawn. See Rescuecom, 562 F.3d at 128-29. Given that Rescuecom intentionally distorted the
meaning of 1-800 Contacts to avoid deviating from stare decisis, this Section does not adopt
Rescuecom's interpretation of 1-800 Contacts; instead, this Section interprets 1-800 Contacts in a
manner that is consistent with that of all other courts in the Second Circuit prior to Rescuecom.
See Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 393, 399-400 (N.D.N.Y. 2006), rev'd, 562
F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009); 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.Com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 403 (2d Cir.
2005); Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 402, 414 (S.D.N.Y.
2006); Tiffany Inc. v. Ebay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 493-95 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Site Pro-i, Inc. v.
Better Metal, LLC, 506 F. Supp. 2d 123, 125 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); Hamzik v. Zale Corp, No. 3:06-cv-
1300, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28981, at *4-7 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2007); Fragrancenet.com, Inc. v.
Fragrancex.com, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 2d 545, 552-53 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
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manner on the good or their containers, or the displays associated
therewith. ' 79 The Second Circuit explained that using trademarks in
metatags and sponsored links did not constitute "use" because the
trademark was never placed on a good.80 In fact, the trademark was
never actually seen by the Internet user.81 The Second Circuit analo-
gized this "internal utilization of a trademark ... to a[n] individual's
private thoughts about a trademark. ' 82 Additionally, it analogized
these trademark uses to product placement: just as a rival can strategi-
cally place its product next to a popular trademarked product, the use
of trademarks in metatags and sponsored links simply allows a rival to
place its link next to its rival's link.8 3
3. The Second Circuit, After Rescuecom
The Second Circuit is the only circuit to have held that the use of
metatags and sponsored links do not constitute "use." However, the
Second Circuit retreated from this position in its 2009 decision of
Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc. In Rescuecom, the Second Circuit
joined the majority in holding that the use of trademarks in sponsored
links and metatags constitutes "use," as defined by the Lanham Act.8 4
Despite the holding in Rescuecom, the Second Circuit never ad-
dressed the issue of consumer confusion because it treated the "use"
inquiry as a threshold barrier to liability8 5 In reaching this conclu-
sion, the Second Circuit repeatedly rejects the suggestion that mere
initial interest confusion,86 absent actual "use," is sufficient to create a
prima facie claim under the Lanham Act.8 7 Thus, liability within the
Second Circuit stems from a competitor's misconduct, not from a con-
79. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
80. See, e.g., Merck & Co., 425 F. Supp. 2d at 415 ("[I]n the search engine context, defendants
do not 'place' the.., marks on any goods or containers or displays or associated documents, nor
do they use them in any way to indicate source or sponsorship."); 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 414 F.3d
at 408-09 (explaining that the trademark was not used because the defendant did not "display"
the trademark).
81. See, e.g., 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 414 F.3d at 409 (explaining that trademarks are not "used,"
as defined by the Lanham Act, when the use of a trademark "does not create a possibility of
visual confusion").
82. 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 414 F.3d at 409.
83. See id. at 411; Merck & Co., 425 F. Supp. 2d at 414.
84. See Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 128-130 (2d Cir. 2009). Although it is
noted that this Comment would quarrel with the reasoning of Rescuecom, including its interpre-
tation of 1-800 Contacts, these issues are beyond the scope of this Comment.
85. 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 414 F.3d at 412 ("[W]hile any number of activities may ... create a
likelihood of confusion, no such activity is actionable under the Lanham Act absent the 'use' of a
trademark.").
86. For an explanation of initial interest confusion, see infra notes 67-76.
87. See, e.g., Fragrancenet.com, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 2d at 551 (explicitly rejecting the initial
interest confusion inquiry used by the majority of circuits).
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sumer's confusion.88 This approach to liability is appropriate because
holding otherwise would allow consumer confusion to condemn con-
duct that is not statutorily prohibited.89
4. The Third Circuit
The Third Circuit has adopted reasoning that resembles a compro-
mise between the conflicting holdings of the Second Circuit, prior to
Rescuecom, and the majority of circuits. The Third Circuit holds that
the use of trademarks in metatags and sponsored links constitutes ac-
tionable "use" because the conduct at issue is a "commercial transac-
tion" that trades on the value of the trademark and ties the
trademarked keyword to the promotion of the non-trademarked
product.90 The Third Circuit, however, finds that the use does not vio-
late the Lanham Act because it does not lead to consumer confu-
sion.91 The Third Circuit reasons that the links on the result pages
"always appear as independent and distinct links," regardless of
whether they are generated through sponsored links or metatags.92
Due to the separate and distinct nature of the links, consumers have
no opportunity to become confused as to the source of the good.93
Furthermore, although a rival might have placed a competitor's trade-
mark in metatags or sponsored links, the rival has not placed the
trademark anywhere that is discernable to Internet users.94
As evident from the conflicting opinions among circuit courts,
whether the Lanham Act prohibits the use of a rival's trademark in
metatags and sponsored links is highly disputed. 95 However, notably
absent from every opinion is an analysis of antitrust law.
88. See 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 414 F.3d at 410 (explaining that even if a competitor appropriates
the goodwill of its rival by using its rival's trademarks, that appropriation does not violate the
Lanham Act if the competitor does not actually "use" the trademark).
89. See Fragrancenet.com, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 2d at 545; Rescuecom Corp., 456 F. Supp. 2d at
398-403; Merck & Co., 425 F. Supp. 2d at 411-416; 1-800 Contacts, 414 F.3d at 407-410; see also
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1035 (9th Cir. 2004) (Berzon,
J., concurring) ("I do not think it is reasonable to find initial interest confusion when a consumer
is never confused as to source or affiliation, but instead knows, or should know, from the outset
that a product or web link is not related to that of the trademark holder because the list pro-
duced by the search engine so informs him.").
90. See, e.g., J:G. Wentworth v. Settlement Funding, No. 06-0597, 2007 WL 30115, at *4-5
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2007); Syncsort Inc. v. Innovative Routines Int'l, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
35364, at *41-46 (D.N.J. Apr. 30, 2008).
91. See, e.g., id. at *4, *6-8.
92. Id. at *7.
93. Id. at *8.
94. Id. at *7.
95. See supra notes 63-94 and accompanying text.
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D. An Outline of the Relevant Statute and Cases of Antitrust Law
Antitrust and trademark laws are inherently interrelated because
trademark laws permit certain restraints on trade while antitrust laws
prohibit unreasonably restrictive restraints on trade.96 To maintain
the integrity of both areas of law, it is well-settled that trademark
owners cannot use trademark laws to circumvent antitrust regula-
tions.97 Unfortunately, the boundary between legal and illegal re-
straints on trade is not self-evident.
Antitrust laws are codified in multiple statutes, but this Comment
will focus on the anticompetitive conduct prohibited by the Sherman
Act.98 Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits concerted action be-
tween two or more entities: "Every contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal." 99 The precise meaning of this statute cannot be gleaned from
its plain language because all contracts restrain trade to some extent,
and therefore, if read literally, the Sherman Act would condemn all
contracts. 100 Consequently, courts have interpreted the Act to pro-
hibit only those restraints that are "unreasonable.'' 101 Yet even this
definition is unsatisfactory, as the meaning of "unreasonable re-
straints" is ambiguous at best.10 2 As a result, courts have developed
multiple tests that attempt to identify the barriers of impermissibly
anticompetitive conduct.'0 3 For example, courts apply a per se test
when defendants engage in price fixing or market division.'0 4 Price
96. See In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (describ-
ing the interrelation of antitrust and trademark laws by stating the following: "Intellectual prop-
erty rights do not confer a privilege to violate the antitrust laws. ... But it is also correct that the
antitrust laws do not negate the patentee's right to exclude others from patent property").
97. Id.
98. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2006).
99. 15 U.S.C. § 1. Section 2 of the Sherman Act focuses on anticompetitive conduct engaged
in by monopolies, but this Comment only focuses on § 1 of the Sherman Act. For an explanation
of the prohibited conduct, see 15 U.S.C. § 2.
100. See United States v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 237-38 (2d Cir. 2003). Likewise, as
evident from the circuit split on the interpretation of the Lanham Act, the plain meaning of the
Lanham Act is not clear and unambiguous. For an argument illustrating the alleged plain mean-
ing of the Lanham Act, see Norris, supra note 2 at 893-894, 907.
101. Visa, 344 F.3d at 237-38.
102. Because "unreasonable" restraints are not obvious, courts apply the rule of reason to
determine whether a restraint is unreasonable. See, e.g., id. at 237-39. For a description of the
rule of reason, see infra notes 112-118.
103. For a discussion about the rule of reason's evolution, see generally Alan J. Meese, Fare-
well to the Quick Look: Redefining the Scope and Content of the Rule of Reason, 68 ANTITRUST
L.J. 461 (2000).
104. WILLIAM C. HOLMES, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK § 2:10 (2007).
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fixing and market division warrant per se condemnation because no
justification can excuse behavior that directly harms consumers. 105
However, most anticompetitive conduct, including exclusionary
conduct, escapes per se condemnation. 10 6 Exclusionary conduct oc-
curs when two or more entities agree to exclude a third party from
accessing consumers or a necessary input of supplies. 10 7 This conduct
may cause the excluded outsider to exit the market or to sell its goods
at a higher price. Consumer welfare can be harmed by the excluded
outsider's exit from the market because the exit could decrease over-
all output and variety within the market. 10 8 Likewise, consumer wel-
fare may suffer when the excluded outsider is forced to raise its prices
because the outsider will pass on these costs to consumers, thus forc-
ing the consumer to pay a higher price for the same good. 10 9 If a court
finds that the exclusionary conduct ultimately harmed consumer wel-
fare, antitrust laws will enjoin the exclusionary conduct. 110 In order to
determine whether the exclusionary conduct actually harms consumer
welfare in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, the courts must apply
the "rule of reason. ' 1 al
105. Although defendants might actually be capable of justifying conduct that qualifies for per
se condemnation, "[tihe rationale for per se rules in part is to avoid a burdensome inquiry into
actual market conditions in situations where the likelihood of anticompetitive conduct is so great
as to render unjustified the costs of determining whether the particular case at bar involves
anticompetitive conduct." FTC v. Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 432 n.15 (1990)
(quoting Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15-16 n.25 (1984)). How-
ever, the per se test is not appropriate in this context because the use of trademarks in metatags
and sponsored links does not involve price fixing or market division.
106. See, e.g., Visa, 344 F.3d at 237-38 (applying the rule of reason, not the per se rule, to
determine if the alleged conduct was impermissibly exclusionary).
107. See A. Douglas Melamed, Exclusive Dealing Agreements and Other Exclusionary Con-
duct-Are There Unifying Principles?, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 375, 375 n.1, 403 (2006) (explaining
that exclusive dealing contracts can harm a rival by preventing that rival from accessing consum-
ers or the requisite inputs of supply).
108. But see PENELOPE A. PREOVOLOS, CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HAND-
BOOK SERIES: UNFAIR PRACTICES AND PREDATORY PRICING 219 (2009) (stating that "[i]f rivals
remain in the market and exit is not reasonably imminent, courts should be 'especially demand-
ing' as to the showing of harm to competition").
109. See Jonathan M. Jacobson, Exclusive Dealing, "Foreclosure," and Consumer Harm, 70
ANTITRUST L.J. 311, 328 (2002) (stating that exclusive dealing contracts are inappropriate if they
tend to allow a firm to "increase prices, restrict output, reduce quality, slow innovation, or other-
wise harm consumers").
110. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Ri-
vals' Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 249-50 (1986); see also Melamed,
supra note 107, at 375, 377-78 (explaining that not all exclusive conduct is illegal because exclu-
sive conduct often creates efficiencies that benefit consumer welfare).
111. See, e.g., Visa, 344 F.3d at 237-38.
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The rule of reason is a burden-shifting test.112 First, the plaintiff
must demonstrate that the defendants' conduct has anticompetitive
effects. 113 To satisfy this burden, the plaintiff must define the relevant
market, establish the colluders' degree of market share, and prove the
amount of market foreclosure and other anticompetitive effects
caused by the exclusion. 1 4 If this burden is met, the plaintiff has al-
leged a prima facie claim of anticompetitive conduct, and the burden
is shifted to the defendants. 115 The defendants must rebut the plain-
tiff's prima facie case by offering procompetitive justifications for
their conduct. 116 Such justifications can include "enhanced efficien-
cies, protection of product or service goodwill, and inducing dealer
loyalty."117 If the defendants can meet this burden, the plaintiff must
prove "either that the challenged restraint is not reasonably necessary
to achieve the defendants' procompetitive justification, or that those
objectives may be achieved in a manner less restrictive of free
competition. '"" 8
Apparent from the brief outlines of antitrust and trademark laws,
these two bodies of law are in tension with one another: while trade-
mark laws justify restraints on trade, antitrust laws prohibit excessive
restraints on trade. This Comment argues that although courts can
rely upon traditional interpretations of these laws to offline activity,
courts should refrain from blindly applying these laws to online activ-
ity in a manner that ignores the unique qualities of e-commerce.
III. ANALYSIS
The Internet has drastically changed the commercial business norms
of consumers and competitors." 9 While consumers may now access
an abundance of information in a matter of seconds, 20 producers
112. See id. at 238 (describing how the burden shifts between the plaintiff and the defendant
when the court employs the rule of reason).
113. Id.
114. See HOLMES, supra note 104, § 2:19, at 354-55.
115. See Visa, 344 F.3d at 238.
116. Id.
117. HOLMES, supra note 104, § 2:10.
118. Visa, 344 F.3d at 238; see Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 936-38 (7th Cir. 2000)
(applying the rule of reason).
119. See Buckman, supra note 2, at 31 ("Commerce has gone way beyond the old-fashioned
corner store. We are in the midst of a technological revolution of the marketplace, exemplified
by the use of the Internet.").
120. See id. at 32 (portraying the Internet as an "information superhighway"); William H.
Hollander & Adam F. Jarboe, Internet Searches and Trademark Infringement, 55 FED. LAW., July
2008, at 12, 12 ("At a touch of a few keystrokes, an abundant and invaluable amount of informa-
tion can be accessed from one's computer or cell phone.").
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have gained access to unprecedented amounts of potential online
sales.121 But the same enormity of information that renders the In-
ternet useful also renders the Internet impenetrable without the aid of
search engines. 122 Given the pervasive use of search engines, competi-
tors that appear at the top of search engine's result pages reap great
rewards, while competitors that fail to appear on the result pages are
competitively handicapped. 123 At the heart of many e-commerce law-
suits is whether, or to what degree, a competitor can use its rival's
trademark to ensure that a link to its website appears at the top of the
result pages.' 24
Companies have a substantial incentive to appear at the top of the
result pages because consumers tend to click only on links that are
located on the first or second page.125 This incentive has rendered the
practice of placing a rival's trademark in metatags and sponsored links
quite common. 126 In fact, both Google and Yahoo! frequently inform
potential purchasers of sponsored links that the most effective
keywords to purchase are often trademarked product names.127 To
illustrate, if an Internet user wishes to search for a dark, Pepsi-like
soda, that user will most likely search with the keyword "Pepsi," as
opposed to a keyword devoid of trademarks, such as "brown carbon-
ated soda beverage."'1 28 Even if the consumer did use the latter, more
awkward description, the search engine's algorithm is unlikely to de-
termine that the consumer desires a Pepsi-like product. 29 Conse-
quently, Pepsi's rivals have a strong economic incentive to purchase
the keyword "Pepsi," rather than a keyword devoid of trademarks.
Ultimately, the question before the courts is whether a competitor
may alter its chances of appearing at the top of the result pages by
using its rival's trademark in metatags and sponsored links. The ma-
jority of circuit courts that have addressed this issue hold that these
121. See Lastowka, supra note 8, at 1328 (stating that "fortunes are won and lost" based on
result pages).
122. See id. at 1332 ("The Internet has been a means of storing and sharing large amounts of
data ... [but] reams of information devoid of an organizing indexical scheme can be useless for
all practical purposes.").
123. See Norris, supra note 2, at 899; Goldman, supra note 14, at 535-36.
124. See supra notes 63-95 and accompanying text.
125. Goldman, supra note 14, at 535.
126. See Douglas McGhee, Looking Beyond "Use" in Predicting Advertiser Liability for Using
Competitors' Marks in Online Advertising, 20 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., Apr. 2008, at 9, 9
(explaining why the most effective search terms are trademarked words).
127. See id.
128. See id. (offering an analogous example of consumer search terms).
129. See Goldman, supra note 14, at 521-22 (providing an example of how chosen keywords
frequently do not yield accurate and relevant results).
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online uses of trademarks violate trademark law, but this Part argues
to the contrary.
Section A demonstrates that the majority has expanded the Lan-
ham Act beyond its plain language and purpose. 130 In addition, this
Section explores how the majority improperly applies traditional
trademark law to the untraditional arena of e-commerce.1 31 Section B
argues that the injunction frequently granted by the majority under-
mines antitrust laws because the majority has interpreted the Lanham
Act as an instrument that can supersede antitrust regulations. 132
A. Trademark Law: The Majority Inappropriately Interprets
The Lanham Act
The majority of circuit courts to reach the issue hold that the use of
trademarks in metatags and sponsored links violates the Lanham
Act. 133 The majority reasons that this conduct constitutes "use" under
the Lanham Act because the use is likely to cause initial interest con-
fusion.1 34 Three flaws undermine the majority's line of reasoning. 135
First, the majority assumes actual "use" whenever initial interest con-
fusion exists.136 This assumption is improper because the "use" ele-
ment is independent and separate from the confusion element. 137
Second, this conduct does not lead to a likelihood of actual consumer
confusion, and by allowing initial interest confusion to satisfy the re-
quirement of confusion, the majority has improperly expanded the
scope of the Lanham Act. 138 Moreover, initial interest confusion
amounts to nothing more than diversion, and in congruence with
traditional trademark laws, courts should refrain from enjoining on-
130. See infra notes 133-212 and accompanying text.
131. See id.
132. See infra notes 213-280 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 67-76 and accompanying text. Absent the consent of the trademark
owner, the Lanham Act prohibits the "use in commerce ... of a registered mark in connection
with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in
connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion." 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2006).
134. See supra note 67-76 and accompanying text. Compare Hysitron Inc. v. M.T.S. Sys. Co.,
No. 07-01533 ADM/AJB, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58378, at *7-8 (D. Minn. Aug. 1, 2008) (adopt-
ing the view that using a trademark to generate advertising constitutes "use" under the Lanham
Act), with Google Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., No. C-05-5340 JF (RS), 2007
U.S. Dist LEXIS 32450, at *21 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2007) (effectively equating the "use" element
with the "confusion" element).
135. See infra notes 143-212 and accompanying text.
136. See infra notes 140-158 and accompanying text.
137. See 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 412 (2d Cir. 2005); infra notes
141-158 and accompanying text.
138. See infra notes 159-186 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 59:181
METATAGS AND SPONSORED LINKS
line diversion. 139 Third, the holdings of the majority directly contra-
dict the purpose of trademark law, which aims to restrain trade for the
benefit of competition. 140 The flawed reasoning of the majority has
led to an inaccurate application of trademark laws to e-commerce.
1. The Use of Trademarks in Metatags and Sponsored Links Does
Not Constitute "Use" Under the Lanham Act
The majority holds that a competitor has "used" its rival's trade-
mark when it places the trademark in metatags and sponsored links.
This conclusion is objectionable because the majority has failed to
treat the "use" and "confusion" requirements as separate and distinct
elements.
The plain meaning of the Act supports the contention that "use"
and "confusion" are independent elements, both of which must be sat-
isfied before finding a violation of the Lanham Act.141 This Act ex-
pressly prohibits the "use in commerce ...of a registered mark in
connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising
of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is
likely to cause confusion.1' 42 The plain meaning of this statute is so
evident that no court has ever suggested that the Lanham Act is com-
prised of two elements instead of three.
Despite the obvious existence of three separate elements in the stat-
utory text, the majority employs reasoning that effectively eliminates
the inquiry into "use." Specifically, the majority reasons that the use
of trademarks in metatags and sponsored links constitutes "use"
under the Lanham Act because it causes initial interest confusion.1 43
This approach allows the majority to condemn conduct after a finding
of confusion and causation, even if the trademark was never actually
"used." Only the Second Circuit has directly criticized the majority's
reasoning as a method that "puts the cart before the horse. '144 The
Second Circuit explained,
139. See id.
140. See infra notes 187-212 and accompanying text.
141. But see Colyer, supra note 5, at 696-708 (explaining the opposing thesis and conclusion,
which ultimately blurs the line between the "use" and "confusion" elements).
142. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
143. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
144. If the use is not actionable, any confusion derived therefrom is immaterial. See 1-800
Contacts, 414 F.3d at 409; Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 393, 403 (N.D.N.Y.
2006), rev'd, 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009); Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting Inc., 425
F. Supp. 2d 402, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). But see Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123,
128-130 (2d Cir. 2009) (marginalizing the meaning of 1-800 Contacts in an attempt to avoid
directly overruling established precedent).
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"[U]se," "in commerce," and "likelihood of confusion" [are] three
distinct elements of a trademark infringement claim .... [and] while
any number of activities may be "in commerce" or create a likeli-
hood of confusion, no such activity is actionable under the Lanham
Act absent the "use of a trademark.' ' 45
In failing to approach each element of the Lanham Act as a separate
element that requires its own individual analysis, the majority col-
lapses the three elements and three inquiries146 into two elements and
two inquiries. 147 This holding expands the scope of the Lanham Act
because it allows for the condemnation of conduct that does not actu-
ally involve the "use" of a trademark. 14 More troubling, given that
the Lanham Act explicitly requires a finding of "use," the majority's
effort to collapse the Lanham Act into two elements resembles judi-
cial lawmaking.
Even district courts that are bound to follow the precedent of the
majority demonstrate an understanding that "use" and "confusion"
are separate and independent elements, each of which requires its
own legal analysis.1 49 Unfortunately, these district courts are com-
pelled to follow the holdings of the circuit courts, and given that the
circuit courts' finding of "use" is improper, any holding based solely
on stare decisis is unpersuasive. 150 However, because that the district
court opinions postdate the majority's opinions, perhaps the district
145. 1-800 Contacts, 414 F.3d at 412.
146. These three elements are: (1) use, as defined by the Lanham Act; (2) confusion resulting
from such use; and (3) use of a trademark in commerce. Id.
147. The two elements are (1) the use caused the consumer to be confused, and (2) in com-
merce. See, e.g., Google Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., No. C-05-5340 JF (RS),
2007 U.S. Dist LEXIS 32450, at *21 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2007).
148. See Fragrancenet.com, Inc. v. Fragrancex.com, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 2d 545, 552 (E.D.N.Y.
2007) ("[I]nternal uses of trademarks in cyberspace are not converted into Lanham Act 'uses'
merely because of the advancements in the effectiveness and scope of advertising that has come
with the development of the Internet.").
149. See, e.g., Google Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., No. C 03-5340 JF (RS),
2007 U.S. Dist LEXIS 32450, at *18 n.l, *21 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2007); Edina Realty, Inc. v.
Themlsonline.com, No. 04-4371JRTFLN, 2006 WL 737064, at *3-4 (D. Minn. Mar. 20, 2006);
Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 702-04 (E.D. Va. 2004).
150. See supra notes 67-94 and accompanying text. Stare decisis is a Latin term that means
"[t]o stand by things decided, and not to disturb settled points." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1443 (8th ed. 2004). While the principle of stare decisis is not a command to which courts must
strictly adhere, "the careful observer will discern that any detours from the straight path of stare
decisis in our past have occurred for articulable reasons, and only when the Court has felt
obliged 'to bring its opinions into agreement with experience and with facts newly ascertained."'
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2824 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 412 (1932) (Brandeis, J. dissenting)). Stare
decisis is favored by courts because it "permits society to presume that bedrock principles are
founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals, and thereby contributes to the
integrity of our constitutional system of government, both in appearance and in fact." Id.
2009] METATAGS AND SPONSORED LINKS
courts' treatment of "use" and "confusion" as two separate elements
will encourage the majority to reevaluate its method of analysis and
adopt a more persuading analytical approach.151
If the majority had inquired into the exact meaning of "use," as
required by the Lanham Act, they would have concluded that the con-
duct at issue did not constitute actionable "use." The Lanham Act
expressly defines "use in commerce" as a trademark "placed in any
manner on the goods. ' 152 In the search engine context, the trademark
is never placed on any good. 153 To belabor this point, the trademark is
neither placed on the good owned by the trademark owner, nor is it
placed on the good owned by its rival.154 In fact, the trademark that
resides in metatags and sponsored links is entirely invisible to the In-
ternet user.155 As such, the use of the trademark is never communi-
cated to the public.156 This analysis is faithful to the definition of
"use," as defined by the Lanham Act itself, and it leads to the obvious
conclusion that trademarks are not "used" when contained in
metatags or sponsored links.1 57 Absent an amendment to the Act's
definition of "use," courts should refrain from altering its clear and
unambiguous textual meaning. Regrettably, the majority's failure to
heed this logical approach leads to an inappropriate application of the
Lanham Act to online activity. 58
151. See, e.g., 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 412 (2d Cir. 2005);
Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 393, 403 (N.D.N.Y. 2006); Merck & Co. v.
Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 402, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
152. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (emphasis added).
153. See Merck & Co., 425 F. Supp. 2d at 415 (explaining that in the metatags and sponsored
links context, trademarks are not placed on any good, nor are they used in a manner that "indi-
cate[s] source or sponsorship").
154. Id.
155. See 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 414 F.3d at 412 (holding that an internal or invisible use of a
trademark does not constitute use); Merck & Co., 425 F. Supp. 2d at 415.
156. See Fragrancenet.com, Inc. v. Fragrancex.com, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 2d 545, 550 (E.D.N.Y.
2007).
157. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
158. This reasoning is expressed by many courts in the Second Circuit. See 1-800 Contacts,
Inc., 414 F.3d at 400; Tiffany Inc. v. Ebay, 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 499-501 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2008);
Hamzik v. Zale Corp., No. 3:06-CV-1300, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28981, at *6-8 (N.D.N.Y. Apr.
19, 2007); Site Pro-], Inc., 506 F. Supp. 2d at 123, 125-28 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); Fragrancenet.com,
Inc., 493 F. Supp. 2d at 550; Merck & Co., 425 F. Supp. 2d at 415; Rescuecom Corp., 456 F. Supp.
2d at 393, 400 (N.D.N.Y. 2006), rev'd, 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009). Although the Second Circuit
is the only circuit to have held that the use of trademarks in metatags and sponsored links does
not constitute "use" under the Lanham Act, the unpopularity of its conclusion does not render
its decision less persuasive. The Second Circuit is often a leader in intellectual property disputes,
not merely a follower of the majority. See, e.g., Graeme W. Austin, Trademarks and the Bur-
dened Imagination, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 827, 896 (2004) (citing a Second Circuit case as a leading
case for the correct application of initial interest confusion); Jessica Amber Drew, Recent Devel-
opment, Death of Dawn Donut: The Demise of Concurrent Trademarks, 2007 U. ILL. J.L. TECH.
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2. The Use of Trademarks in Metatags and Sponsored Links Is Not
Likely to Cause Consumer Confusion
The use of trademarks in metatags and sponsored links does not
create a "likelihood of confusion." The majority of courts have
reached a contrary conclusion by failing to require proof of consumer
confusion as to the source of the good in question, by allowing a mere
diversion to satisfy the strict requirements of "confusion," and by con-
sidering the interests of only some Internet users while ignoring the
interests of the others. These flaws render the majority's holdings
unpersuasive.
a. The Majority Has Lowered the Standard of "Confusion" to
"Initial Interest Confusion"
No court has ever found that the use of trademarks in metatags and
sponsored links causes a likelihood of actual confusion as to the
source of the good. 159 Despite this obvious obstacle, the majority
holds that these uses violate the Lanham Act.160 The majority reasons
that although Internet users are not likely to be actually confused
when purchasing an online good, the use of trademarks in metatags
and sponsored links causes "initial interest confusion.' 16' Initial inter-
est confusion occurs when Internet users type a trademark into a
search engine with the intention of visiting the website of the trade-
mark owner, but the search engine provides a link to both the trade-
mark owner's website and its rival's website. 162 By inadvertently
clicking on the link that belongs to a rival of the trademark owner, the
Internet users are diverted to the rival's website.163 Although the In-
ternet users quickly discover their error, the needs of some Internet
users will be perfectly satisfied by the rival's website. 164 This, under
the majority's reasoning, is tantamount to the rival appropriating the
& POL'Y 145, 146 (2007) (citing a Second Circuit case as the leading case regarding concurrent
trademarks).
159. See McGhee, supra note 126, at 11 ("[Ijt is difficult to see how the standards for 'actual
confusion' could be satisfied when the use of the trademark is invisible to the potential
purchaser.").
160. See Hysitron, Inc. v. M.T.S. Sys. Corp., No. 07-01533 ADM/AJB, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
58378, at *6-8 (D. Minn. Aug. 1, 2008) (articulating the majority and minority holdings).
161. See, e.g., Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1061-65
(9th Cir. 1999).
162. See id. at 1062.
163. See id.
164. See id. (stating that consumers originally looking for the trademark owner's website may
be perfectly happy to remain on its competitor's website).
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goodwill associated with the trademark owner. 165 As a result, the ma-
jority holds that initial interest confusion satisfies the Lanham Act's
"confusion" requirement. 166
It is initially noted that the reasoning of the majority presumptively
assumes that Internet users click on a rival's website under the mis-
taken belief that the link will take them to the trademark owner's
website. 167 This is an extreme assumption because each link is visually
separated from the others, and only one link will advertise the trade-
marked words. 168 In this modern, technologically savvy era, to as-
sume that Internet users cannot decipher which link belongs to the
trademark owner is tantamount to assuming that Internet users are
dim-witted and impulsive. 169
More importantly, the reasoning of the majority lacks merit because
the Lanham Act requires confusion as to "the source of the goods in
question. '170  Unlike actual confusion, "initial interest confusion" is
temporary, and it ends before the consumer actually purchases a
good.171 Accordingly, initial interest confusion cannot satisfy the stat-
utory definition of "confusion" because initial interest confusion
never creates a likelihood that consumers will become actually con-
fused as to the source of the good in question. 172 Judge Marsha S.
165. See id. (explaining that the competitor's use of the trademark to divert its rival's custom-
ers allows the competitor to "improperly benefit[ ] from the goodwill" of its rival).
166. See, e.g., id.
167. See, e.g., J.G. Wentworth S.S.C. Ltd. v. Settlement Funding L.L.C., No. 06-0597, 2007
WL 30115, at *7-8 (E.D. Pa. Jan 4, 2007).
168. See id.
169. See Hollander & Jarboe, supra note 120, at 13 (suggesting that while "users are becoming
more adept at Internet advertisement tactics," the likelihood of consumer confusion will
diminish).
170. See Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 402, 411 (S.D.N.Y.
2006) (stating that a "[i]ikelihood of confusion requires that 'an appreciable number of ordina-
rily prudent purchasers are likely to be misled, or indeed simply confused, as to the source of the
goods in question"') (internal citation omitted); 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1); Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc.,
174 F.3d at 1053 (requiring a confusion as to the "source or sponsorship"); Buckman, supra note
2, at 31 (stating that the purpose of trademark law is to prevent the use of trademarks in a
manner that "confuses the public about the actual source of the goods and services"); Chang,
supra note 55, at 136 (explaining that the confusion requirement in the Lanham Act refers to
confusion existing at the "offering for sale"); Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Right of Owner of
Trademark for Apparel or Toiletries to Protection Under Lanham Act (15 USCS § 1114(1))
Against Infringement by Another's Use of Similar Mark for Different Items of Apparel or Toilet-
ries, 38 A.L.R. FED. 374, 380 (1978) (implying that a purpose of trademark law is to protect the
consumer from purchasing goods while confused about the source of those goods).
171. See Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1062-65 (explaining the judicially created
initial interest confusion doctrine).
172. See, e.g., Chang, supra note 55, at 138 (discussing Playboy v. Netscape and concluding
that initial interest confusion cannot cause an Internet user to become confused as to the source
of the good).
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Berzon voiced this concern when she predicted that an application of
the initial interest confusion doctrine will lead to findings of trade-
mark infringement even "when a consumer is never confused as to the
source or affiliation. ' 173 Therefore, in holding that mere initial inter-
est confusion satisfies the more stringent requirement of a likelihood
of actual confusion, the majority has inappropriately expanded the
scope of the Lanham Act.174
b. Initial Interest Confusion Amounts to Lawful Online Diversion
Initial interest confusion cannot satisfy the "confusion" requirement
because the Lanham Act does not condemn conduct that causes con-
sumer diversion. 175 Diversion is lawful, and it occurs when a con-
sumer seeks out a trademarked product, but due to some action of a
competitor, the consumer's attention is diverted to the competing
product.' 76 For example, a competitor can lawfully divert consumers
by placing its product or advertisement next to that of its rival. 177
Analogously, initial interest confusion amounts to online diversion be-
cause placing a trademark in metatags and sponsored links simply al-
lows a competitor to place a link to its website next to the trademark
owner's link.178
Congress has repeatedly concluded that "offline" diversion is legal
because it does not confuse consumers as to the source of a prod-
173. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004)
(Berzon, J., concurring), discussed in Chang, supra note 55, at 138.
174. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the
Internet, 41 Hous. L. REv. 777, 781 (2004) (stating that the initial interest confusion doctrine has
expanded the kinds of trademark usage now subject to infringement claims, adding that "al-
though the initial interest confusion doctrine at first only involved competitors who were clearly
attempting to confuse consumers into reaching the wrong sites, over time the doctrine has been
invoked to prevent noncompetitive uses as well as uses that appeared more likely to enlighten
than to confuse").
175. See Chang, supra note 55, at 139 (explaining that the initial interest doctrine prohibits
conduct that merely diverts consumers).
176. See, e.g., Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1062.
177. See, e.g., 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 410-11 (2d Cir. 2005);
Site Pro-i, Inc. v. Better Metal, 506 F. Supp. 2d 123, 126-27 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); Fragrancenet.com,
Inc. v. Fragrancex.com, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 2d 545, 550-52 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); Hamzik v. Zale Corp.,
No. 3:06-CV-130, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28981, at *6-8 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2007); Merck & Co.
v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 402, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Rescuecom Corp.
v. Google, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 393, 401-03 (N.D.N.Y. 2006); see also Tiffany Inc. v. Ebay, Inc.,
576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 498-500 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (explaining the contours of diversion); Chang,
supra note 55, at 139 (claiming that a prohibition on diversion will prohibit many previously legal
acts of diversion, such as comparative advertising).
178. See Chang, supra note 55, at 133-35. See generally Thomas R. Lee, Glenn L. Christensen
& Eric D. DeRosia, Trademarks, Consumer Psychology, and the Sophisticated Consumer, 57
EMORY L.J. 575, 596, 646-47 (2008) (explaining diversion).
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uct.1 79 In fact, Congress declined an opportunity in 1988 to amend the
language of the Lanham Act to prohibit diversion, presumably be-
cause it refused to lower the "confusion" standard to a mere "diver-
sion" standard.180 Thus, contrary to legislative intent, the majority has
presumptuously declared that online diversion violates trademark
laws. 181 In doing so, the majority has inappropriately expanded the
scope of the Lanham Act by replacing the strict requirement of con-
sumer confusion with the less stringent requirement of initial interest
confusion.'18 2
c. The Majority Has Failed to Consider the Interests and
Objectives of Many Internet Users
The majority's reasoning also fails because it only considers the in-
terests of one specific type of Internet users: those who type trade-
marks into search engines with the sole intention of traveling to the
trademark owner's website. However, the majority has completely ig-
nored the interests of another group of Internet users: those who type
trademarks into search engines in order to gain all relevant informa-
tion related to that trademark.18 3 In particular, these ignored consum-
ers seek information about the trademarked product and all rival
products. 184 Therefore, when the majority grants an injunction to
serve the interest of one subset of consumers, it fails to vindicate the
interests of another subset of consumers. 185 In reaching a holding that
179. Chang, supra note 55, at 140. Chang explains how the prevention of diversion will not
reduce consumer confusion. Internet users are sophisticated enough to understand that search
engines frequently produce competing links that may lead to consumer diversion, but will not
lead to a confusion as to the source of goods. See id.
180. Rather than equate "confusion" with "diversion," Congress understood that the prohibi-
tion of a mere diversion would render many consumer-friendly business practices illegal. See id.
at 134, 144; see also Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-667, tit. 1, § 127, 102 Stat.
3935, 3943-44 (1988).
181. See Chang, supra note 55, at 139 (stating that the statute only prohibits uses that "are
likely to cause confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive"); cf 15 U.S.C. 1114(1)(a) (2006).
182. See Lastowka, supra note 8, at 1371; see also Buckman, supra note 2, at 33-34 ("[Tjhe
essential question is whether there is a likelihood of confusion between the parties' goods or
services. It is therefore irrelevant whether consumers are confused as to the origin of particular
websites, unless that confusion goes to the origin of the respective products.").
183. See Chang, supra note 55, at 140 (explaining that courts cannot assume that a consumer
types in a keyword with the intention of traveling to the trademark owner's website; instead,
courts must realize that some consumers type trademarks into search engines with the intention
of looking for comparable products or substitutes); Lee et al., supra note 178, at 575-76 (sug-
gesting that courts have failed to accurately analyze and depict the actual Internet user, and
claiming that courts tend to engage in a "vacuous war of words, uninformed by any careful
theoretical modeling of consumer psychology or empirical study of consumer behavior").
184. See Chang, supra note 55, at 140.
185. See generally Michael Grynberg, Trademark Litigation as Consumer Conflict, 83 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 60, 60 (2008); see also supra note 89 (listing cases that fail to consider the interest of
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completely ignores an entire class of consumers, the majority engages
in rash logic and faulty reasoning. Additionally, the majority's hold-
ings expand the scope of the Lanham Act because they rest on the
flawed assumption that the initial interest confusion of one subset of
consumers satisfies the statutory definition of "confusion. 11 86
3. The Majority's Reasoning Is Inconsistent with the Purpose of
Trademark Laws
The purpose of the Lanham Act is to protect and enhance competi-
tion in the marketplace by preserving the clarity of trademarks.187
This sentiment is clearly expressed in the Senate Report, which states
that the Lanham Act is intended "to protect the public from deceit
[and] to foster fair competition.118 8 In the interest of competition,
trademark laws serve the dual purpose of protecting both the
merchants who own trademarks and the consumers who rely upon
trademarks when purchasing goods or services. 189 However, the dual
purposes of trademark law are not equal.190 Instead, trademark laws
focus on the consumer: "[T]he interest of the producer ought to be
attended to, only so far as it may be necessary for promoting that of
the consumer."1 91 This Section argues that the majority of circuit
courts adhere to a view that is in direct conflict with the stated pur-
pose of the Lanham Act. 192
The pro-competitive purpose of the Lanham Act is reflected in
Richard Posner and William Landes's search costs theory. 193 The
search costs theory explains that a trademark's value derives from its
ignored Internet users who search with trademarks in order to find information about the trade-
marked product and similar non-trademarked products). See generally Grynberg, supra (discuss-
ing the different types of Internet users); Lee et al., supra note 178, at 596, 646-47 (explaining
diversion).
186. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
187. See Chang, supra note 55, at 133; Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, A Search-Costs
Theory of Limiting Doctrines in Trademark Law, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 1223, 1227 (2007) ("Like
antitrust laws, false advertising laws, and other consumer protection statues, trademark law both
draws from and reinforces the notion that competitive markets, under ordinary circumstances,
will ensure efficient resource allocation and bring consumers the highest quality products at the
lowest prices.").
188. Chang, supra note 55, at 133 (quoting S. REP. No. 1333, at 3-4 (1946)).
189. See Rydstrom, supra note 170, at 380 (explaining that trademarks serve the dual purpose
of protecting both the consumer and the merchant).
190. See Grynberg, supra note 185, at 117 ("[T]here is no room in the consumer-conflict story
for any protection of goodwill except as a function of protecting consumers.").
191. Id. (quoting ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF THE NATIONS: BooKs IV-V, at 245 (An-
drew Skinner ed., Penguin Books 1999) (1776)).
192. See infra notes 193-212 and accompanying text.
193. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective,
30 J. L. & ECON. 265, 268-70 (1987).
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ability to reduce consumer search costs by quickly conveying relevant
information to the consumer, thus promoting overall efficiency in the
economy.' 94 In other words, trademark laws are enforced in order to
help consumers locate products with greater ease and less expense. 195
However, the holdings and injunctive remedies favored by the major-
ity actually prevent consumers from quickly and easily using search
engines to reach all relevant information.196 In fact, prohibiting the
use of trademarks in metatags and sponsored links effectively ensures
that links to the websites of competitors will not appear on result
pages, which ultimately reduces the amount of information available
to Internet users. Thus, the majority's injunctive remedies threaten to
undermine the search costs theory because they increase consumer
search costs by rendering search engines less efficient. 197 Accordingly,
the majority's approach should be abandoned because it tends to sup-
press competition, in direct violation of the Lanham Act's stated
purpose.1 98
In applying the search costs theory to cases involving metatags and
sponsored links, courts must balance two opposing factors. On one
hand, if a court grants an injunction, consumers might benefit from
the ability to quickly find the trademark owner's website. 199 On the
other hand, if the injunction is granted, the court has effectively re-
duced the total amount of information available to online consum-
ers.200 Some may argue that, on balance, the cost of reduced
information to consumers is outweighed by the benefit of clear and
unambiguous use of trademarks.201 However, that argument ignores
that the information this injunction eliminates from search results is
essential in competitive markets, including information about a rival's
194. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 187, at 1232 (stating that the use of trademarks in
metatags and sponsored links gives consumers "valuable information, and so permitting the use
is consistent with the goal of lowering consumer search costs").
195. Id. at 1223.
196. See supra notes 232-236 and accompanying text.
197. See Lastowka, supra note 8, at 1391.
198. In addition to suppressing information, the majority's holdings are likely to entrench the
market dominance of trademark owners and reduce the likelihood of market entry. See Dogan
& Lemley, supra note 187, at 1224.
199. See Goldman, supra note 14, at 552 (explaining that trademarks can lower search costs
"by reducing confusion and sharpening the communicative effects of words").
200. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 187, at 1251 (concluding that granting an injunction can
have the "unintended consequence of increasing rather than reducing consumer search costs").
201. When determining liability, courts must balance the conflicting interest of the litigating
parties; courts do this through the use of the rule of reason. See infra notes 243-250 and accom-
panying text. Because consumers have an interest in increased information, defendants must
offer a procompetitive justification for their acts, sufficient to outweigh the harm caused by a
decrease in information. See id.
2009]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
decision to decrease prices, increase quality, or enter the market.20 2
Given trademark law's purpose of promoting "competitive markets by
improving the quality of information in those markets," 20 3 courts
should rule in favor of denying the injunction.
Critics may argue that although the injunction prohibits the use of
trademarks in metatags and sponsored links, the information is still on
the Internet and subject to consumer discovery. As a result, these
critics will assert that consumers benefit from the injunction. This ar-
gument is not persuasive because it ignores the reality that a large
quantity of information is useless if consumers cannot process it in a
reasonable amount of time.20 4 Unfortunately, search engines are cur-
rently the only tool that allows an Internet user to quickly find rele-
vant information. 20 5 Additionally, trademarks are often the most
relevant and frequently used keywords. 20 6 Thus, the fact that the in-
formation is still available somewhere on the Internet is immaterial
because that information will not be found by the consumer.20 7 It is
this reality that the majority has ignored.
When competitors use trademark laws as an instrument to stifle
competition, consumers are cut off from valuable information. 208 The
lack of information "increases the possibility of conflicts between
seller and consumer interests. ' 20 9 However, the Lanham Act is meant
to benefit consumers, not to assist one competitor in the domination
of its rival.210 Therefore, when conflicts arise between consumers and
sellers, trademark law should ensure that consumers prevail and that
competition is preserved. 211 The majority of circuit courts failed to
heed this principle when they adopted an approach that restricts infor-
mation in a manner that handicaps the Lanham Act's ability to pro-
mote competition. 212 As a result, the majority's holdings digress from
202. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 187, at 1232 (stating that "[a]bsent some legitimate
reason to prevent [the use of trademarks], trademark law accepts the core premise that unfet-
tered competition will generate the best results for consumers").
203. Id. at 1227.
204. See Lastowka, supra note 8, at 1332 ("[Tlhe Internet has been a means of storing and
sharing large amounts of data . . . [but] reams of information devoid of an organizing indexical
scheme can be useless for all practical purposes.").
205. See id. at 1327 ("Google has become ... the index of choice for online information.").
206. See McGhee, supra note 126, at 9.
207. See Lastowka, supra note 8, at 1332.
208. See supra notes 193-212 and accompanying text.
209. See Grynberg, supra note 185, at 65-66.
210. See id. at 117 ("[Tjhere is no room.., for any protection of goodwill except as a function
of protecting consumers.").
211. See Chang, supra note 55, at 133; Dogan & Lemley, supra note 187, at 1227.
212. See Chang, supra note 55, at 137-42.
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the objectives of trademark law and expands the scope of the Lanham
Act far beyond its intended purpose.
B. Antitrust Laws: The Majority Advocates Holdings and Remedies
that Undermine Antitrust Laws and Principles
Internet technology outpaces legislation at a staggering speed.
Thus, courts are routinely confronted with issues of first impression
with little or no guidance from legislators or other courts.213 The ap-
plication of trademark laws to search engine activity is one such exam-
ple.214 This Part argues that courts must apply trademark laws to the
Internet with caution because a strict application threatens the objec-
tives of antitrust laws. 215
All trademarks restrain trade. 216 The restraint is justified by a cor-
relating benefit-namely, the trademark's ability to quickly and con-
cisely relay relevant information to the consumer.2 17  Thus,
trademarks benefit competition by enhancing the efficiencies of mar-
kets. As Posner and Landes analogize, allowing a competitor to inap-
propriately use its rival's trademark is like "allowing a second rancher
to graze his cattle on a pasture the optimal use of which required that
only one herd be allowed to graze. ' 218 But over-enforcement of
trademark laws can result in conduct that is too restrictive and, in ef-
fect, anticompetitive.2 19 The danger of over-enforcement is an ineffi-
cient market, and to extend Landes and Posner's analogy, over-
enforcing trademark laws is like allowing only one cow to graze on a
pasture the optimal use of which requires that the entire herd be al-
lowed to graze.
The greatest threat to competition arises from judicial rulings that
sanction over-enforcement of trademarks.220 These holdings entrench
market dominance and allow trademark owners to promote anticom-
petitive objectives under the pretext of trademark enforcement. 221
213. See Adam R. Bialek & Scott M. Smedresman, Internet Risk Management: A Guide to
Limiting Risk Through Web Site Terms and Proactive Enforcement, 20 INTELL. PROP. & TECH.
L.J., Nov. 2008, at 1, 10; Paul L. Bonewitz, Note, Beyond Confusion: Reexamining Trademark
Law's Goals in the World of Online Advertising, 81 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 899, 920 (2007).
214. See Bonewitz, supra note 213, at 920.
215. See infra notes 216-280 and accompanying text.
216. See Burton Ong, Protecting Well-Known Trade Marks: Perspectives from Singapore, 95
TRADEMARK REP. 1221, 1237-1239 (2005) (discussing the restraints of trademark law in China
and Singapore on trade).
217. Landes & Posner, supra note 193, at 269.
218. Id.
219. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 187, at 1227.
220. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 159 (1978).
221. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 187, at 1224.
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This Section demonstrates that the majority's injunctive remedy
blindly applies traditional trademark law in a manner that systemati-
cally undermines competition and ignores the role of antitrust
regulations.
1. Exclusionary Conduct May Harm Consumer Welfare
Courts have understood the Sherman Act to prohibit only those re-
straints on trade that are "unreasonable. ' 222 Unreasonable restraints
manifest themselves in many varieties, one of which stems from an-
ticompetitive exclusionary conduct.223 Anticompetitive exclusionary
conduct can occur in two distinct manners.22 4 First, colluding entities
can agree to exclude an outsider from gaining access to consumers,
and second, colluding entities can exclude an outsider from gaining
access to a necessary input of supply. 225
Exclusionary behavior is only anticompetitive if it harms consumer
welfare.2 26 Most exclusionary behavior is not anticompetitive because
the behavior either enhances or ignores consumer welfare. 227 For ex-
ample, a candy manufacturing company may keep its costs down by
promising to purchase all its peanuts from one peanut supplier. This
type of contract, although exclusionary, enhances consumer welfare
because consumers benefit from the decreased prices associated with
the cost savings of the exclusive dealing contract. However, exclusive
dealing contracts also have the potential to harm consumer welfare. 228
For example, if an exclusive dealing contract prevents an excluded
outsider from gaining access to consumers or an affordable source of
supplies, that outsider may be forced to pay higher prices for the de-
sired access to consumers or goods.229 This could result in either of
the following consequences: (1) the outsider will pass the higher costs
to the consumer by charging higher prices for the same goods, or (2)
222. United States v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 237-38 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Arizona v.
Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 342-43 (1982).
223. See HOLMES, supra note 104, § 2:19.
224. Monopolists can also engage in prohibited exclusionary conduct by excluding smaller
competitors from supply sources or consumers. See id. This type of conduct is prohibited by
both the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) ("Every person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons,
to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony .. "); 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006) (comprising the relevant
portion of the Clayton Act). This Comment, however, will only focus on collective agreements
to exclude that are prohibited by § 1 of the Sherman Act.
225. See Melamed, supra note 107, at 375 n.1, 403.
226. See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 110, at 249-50.
227. See HOLMES, supra note 104, § 2:10, at 184.
228. See id. at 185.
229. See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 110, at 229.
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the outsider will leave the market because it is unable to compete effi-
ciently. 230 If either result occurs, consumer welfare diminishes be-
cause both may result in an increase in prices, a decrease in outputs,
or a decrease in the quality of outputs. 231
In the context of metatags and sponsored links, consumer welfare is
harmed by the majority's injunctive remedy because it prevents con-
sumers from gaining access to information that is essential to a well-
functioning, competitive market.232 Absent an injunction, search en-
gines will sell trademarks as sponsored links to any willing buyer, and
companies will place their rival's trademarks in metatags. These prac-
tices enable Internet users to type a trademarked phrase into a search
engine and obtain information about the trademarked product, as well
as a rival's competing product.2 33 This information enhances con-
sumer welfare because it ensures that sellers offer products at compet-
itive prices. 234 For example, if a trademark owner raises its price
above the competitive level, consumers will purchase the rival's prod-
uct at a lower cost; once enough consumers refuse to purchase the
trademarked product, the trademark owner will lower its inflated
price.2 35 Thus, absent an injunction, search engines provide crucial
competitive information that enhances competition and consumer
welfare. Conversely, granting the injunction prevents a consumer
from accessing relevant competitive information, and therefore, the
injunction handicaps the Internet's ability to remain a competitive fo-
rum.236 Specifically, the consumer is denied information about prod-
uct substitutes, price decreases, and improvements in the quality of
goods.237 The deprivation of this essential competitive information di-
230. See Andrew I. Gavil, Exclusionary Distribution Strategies by Dominant Firms: Striking a
Better Balance, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 3, 38-39 (2004) (explaining the dual harms that can result
from anticompetitive exclusionary conduct); see also Omega Envtl., Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc., 127
F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that one of the major harms of exclusive dealing con-
tracts is that they "'foreclose' existing competitors or new entrants from competition in the...
relevant market").
231. See Jacobson, supra note 109, at 328 (stating that exclusive dealing contracts are inappro-
priate if they tend to allow a firm to "increase prices, restrict output, reduce quality, slow innova-
tion, or otherwise harm consumers").
232. See Chang, supra note 55, at 142 (claiming that the preclusion of trademark use may
hinder the free flow of information on the Internet, which is certainly not a goal of the Lanham
Act).
233. See Niva Elkin-Koren, Let the Crawlers Crawl: On Virtual Gatekeepers and the Right to
Exclude Indexing, 26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 179, 180-82 (2001).
234. See infra notes 289-301 and accompanying text.
235. See id.
236. See id.; Grynberg, supra note 185, at 65 (warning that over-enforcement of trademark
laws can "cut off consumers from valuable information").
237. See Philip J. Weiser, The Next Frontier for Network Neutrality, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 273,
290-91 (2008) (discussing the importance of informed consumers in competitive markets).
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minishes consumer welfare, and therefore, it is appropriate to inquire
whether antitrust regulations prohibit the injunction.
2. The Court-Ordered Injunction Resembles an Exclusive Dealing
Contract
The majority of circuit courts will enjoin a competitor from using its
rival's trademark in metatags and sponsored links.238 The injunction
does not benefit the search engine, which, absent an injunction, gains
enormous profits from selling trademarked words as keywords. 239
Thus, the only benefit derived from the injunction is retained by the
trademark owner in the form of less information available to consum-
ers, which results in less competition from rivals.2 40 Courts should
consider whether this injunction, which precludes the non-trademark
owners from purchasing the most effective sponsored links, exces-
sively restrains trade in a manner that violates antitrust laws. Two
issues must be resolved in order to respond to this query. First, does
the injunction, if granted, resemble an exclusive dealing contract? If
so, would the injunction amount to a violation of antitrust laws?
a. The Injunction Resembles an Exclusive Dealing Contract
The injunction undeniably resembles an exclusive dealing contract.
In the pursuit of profits, search engines will sell as many keywords as
possible. However, the injunction prohibits search engines from sell-
ing its product to all willing buyers because it limits search engines to
one customer: the trademark owner.241 Therefore, the injunction ef-
fectively forces search engines to enter into an exclusive dealing con-
tract with the trademark owner. A contrary holding clings to form
over substance.242 The only remaining issue becomes whether this ex-
clusive dealing contract is prohibited by antitrust laws.
238. See supra notes 63-95 and accompanying text.
239. See Google Form, supra note 4 (recording the record profits earned by the most popular
search engine); see also McGhee, supra note 126, at 9 (explaining why the most effective
keywords are often trademarked terms); Colyer, supra note 5, at 679 (stating that sponsored
linking "represents more than 40% of all Internet advertising").
240. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 187, at 1251 (concluding that granting an "injunction
can have the unintended consequence of increasing rather than reducing consumer search
costs").
241. See, e.g., Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1066 (9th
Cir. 1999) (granting an injunction that forces search engines to sell trademarked keywords only
to the trademark owner).
242. This is not an exclusive deal that was voluntarily engaged in by both parties in order to
obtain unfair competitive advantages. Instead, the deal was mandated by courts. Therefore,
although the exclusive dealing does not take the form of most anticompetitive exclusive dealings,
in effect, the majority of courts have issued injunctions that resemble exclusive dealing contracts.
[Vol. 59:181
METATAGS AND SPONSORED LINKS
b. The Majority's Use of Injunctions May Violate Antitrust Laws
Most exclusive dealing contracts are lawful.243 To determine if an
exclusive dealing contract violates § I of the Sherman Act, a court
must apply the rule of reason.244 This test first requires the plaintiff to
prove that the defendants' conduct caused harmful, anticompetitive
effects. 245 To satisfy this burden, the plaintiff must define the relevant
market, establish the degree of market share accounted for by the
contract, and prove that the contract causes anticompetitive effects.2 46
Once the plaintiff meets this burden, the plaintiff has alleged a prima
facie claim of anticompetitive conduct and the burden of proof shifts
to the defendants. 247 To rebut a prima facie claim, the defendants
must offer procompetitive justifications for its conduct. 248 Such justifi-
cations can include "enhanced efficiencies, protection of product or
service goodwill, and inducing dealer loyalty. '249 If the defendants
meet this burden, the plaintiff must prove either that the restraint is
not reasonably necessary to achieve the defendants' procompetitive
justifications, or that those objectives may be achieved in a less restric-
tive manner. 250 Although statistical data about the market in the con-
text of metatags and sponsored links is unknown, this Section suggests
that if courts applied the rule of reason in this context, they may find
that an injunctive remedy is overly restrictive of competition, and in
effect, anticompetitive.2 51
243. See Jacobson, supra note 109, at 312 ("[T]he typical exclusive dealing arrangement is
entirely lawful ... [because] exclusive dealing can serve important business purposes, and is
often a preferred means for waging legitimate competition."): see also Elec. Commc'ns Corp. v.
Toshiba Am. Consumer Prods., Inc., 129 F.3d 240, 245 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that exclusive
distributorship arrangements are presumptively legal).
244. The U.S. Supreme Court effectively requires lower courts to apply the rule of reason in
order to determine if the conduct is per se unlawful. See Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac.
Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284. 288-89, 293-95 (1985). In the lower courts, however,
most judges apply only the rule of reason. See, e.g., United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d
229, 237-38 (2d Cir. 2003). Thus, while the state of the applicable test seems to be in flux, the
pervasive trend in lower courts is the application of the rule of reason. See id. This result is
consistent with the approach used in all collusive conduct challenged under § 1 of the Sherman
Act. See HOLMES, supra note 104, § 2:19, at 356; see, e.g., Calif. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S.
756, 769-781 (1999).
245. See, e.g., Visa, 344 F.3d at 238.
246. See HOLMES, supra note 104, § 2:19, at 354-56; see, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.
2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 45 (1984).
247. See, e.g., Visa, 344 F.3d at 238.
248. See, e.g., id.
249. HOLMES, supra note 104, § 2:10, at 173.
250. See Visa, 344 F.3d at 238; Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 936-38 (7th Cir. 2000)
(applying the rule of reason).
251. See infra notes 252-280 and accompanying text.
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i. The relevant market is the market for sponsored links
Defining the relevant market "provides the context against which to
measure the competitive effect of an agreement. '' 252 The relevant
market is defined as all products "reasonably interchangeable by con-
sumers for the same purposes. ' 253 In the search engine context, In-
ternet users comprise the consumer market.2 54 Competitors must
have access to this market in order to compete successfully against
online rivals.255 Additionally, the product market in this context con-
sists of sponsored links sold by search engines. This market represents
a source of supply that online competitors find indispensible: informa-
tion. 256 If a competitor cannot purchase sponsored links to relay in-
formation to consumers, that competitor's ability to compete is
severely hindered. This market definition comprises the complete rel-
evant market because no substitute for sponsored links exists.257
ii. The excluders possess substantial market power
After defining the relevant market, courts must determine the
amount of market power possessed by the parties to the exclusive
dealing contract. 258 In order to gauge market power, courts analyze
the amount of the market foreclosed to the excluded outsider.2 9 If
the market foreclosure is substantial enough, the court may conclude
that the exclusive dealing contract is anticompetitive. 260 In the search
engine context, trademarked keywords represent the most efficient
part of the sponsored link market because online consumers typically
252. Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 386 F.3d 485, 496 (2d Cir. 2004).
253. United States v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956).
254. This market definition assumes the competing companies actually compete online. If no
online competition is occurring, the injunction would be immaterial. Critics may argue that the
relevant market is all consumers, not just Internet users. Yet, even if the entire market of con-
sumers was considered the relevant market, a substantial part of the market would still be fore-
closed because many offline purchasers use the Internet to research products, even if they decide
to buy the researched product in person. See generally Lastowka, supra note 8.
255. Companies that offer online sales record astonishing profits as more and more consumers
engage in e-commerce. See Birck, supra note 3, at 629-30. In order to compete with online
rivals, competitors must have unabated access to online consumers.
256. To compete online, competitors must be able to inform consumers of their products. By
placing trademarks in metatags and purchasing trademarks as sponsored links, competitors are
attaining a necessary input of supply from search engines: information. Without this supply,
online competitors cannot adequately compete.
257. No substitute exists for the information provided through the Internet because the In-
ternet is unique; no other product can offer all the services and conveniences of the Internet.
Accordingly, no substitute exists for Internet consumers.
258. See HOLMES, supra note 104, § 2:19, at 355.
259. See id.
260. See id. § 2:19, at 356.
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type trademarked words as keywords,261 and furthermore, online con-
sumers usually use search engines as their exclusive means of gaining
information. 262 Accordingly, although this type of injunction does not
foreclose the non-trademark owner's access to non-trademarked
keywords, even the foreclosure of the most efficient part of the mar-
ket may give rise to antitrust liability.263
The foreclosure of the most efficient part of the sponsored link mar-
ket is excessive because the excluded outsiders cannot afford to incur
the costs of exclusion.264 Although the excluded outsider could buy a
different, non-trademarked keyword, those keywords frequently yield
unprofitable results. 265 In addition, and for obvious reasons, the ex-
cluded consumer cannot incur the cost of creating and marketing a
new Internet with new search engines.266 Therefore, these injunctions
foreclose access to a market that the outsider cannot feasibly substi-
tute. Also problematic, the injunctions discourage new sellers from
entering the market, given that the new sellers may be effectively pro-
hibited from efficiently advertising on the Internet.267
Given the excessive amount of market foreclosure, it seems likely
that search engines and trademark owners possess great market
power. 268 The resulting harm is extraordinary not only because the
excluded competitors are unable to bear the cost of the exclusion, but
also because potential competitors are likely to be dissuaded from en-
tering a market that is completely controlled by the trademark
owner. 269 Therefore, the strength of the argument against these in-
junctions is quite substantial.
iii. Trademark owners lack adequate procompetitive justifications
But the inquiry is not yet complete. An exclusive dealing contract
between parties with excessive power in the relevant market is still
261. See McGhee, supra note 126, at 9.
262. See Lastowka, supra note 8, at 1327-28 (explaining, in particular, Google's popularity).
263. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 69-71 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also AN-
DREW I. GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN
COMPETITION POLICY 841 (2d ed., 2008) (explaining that anticompetitive conduct can occur
when the most efficient part of the market is cut off from rivals).
264. See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 110, at 250-51.
265. HOLMES, supra note 104, § 2:19, at 354-56.
266. Cf. United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 395-96, 410 (1912)
(stating that excluded competitors could not incur the cost of building a new railroad, and conse-
quently, that foreclosure was unacceptable).
267. Cf. United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 240-41 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that
the defendants' exclusionary conduct inappropriately prevented rivals from entering the relevant
market); GAVIL ET AL., supra note 230, at 39-42.




lawful if the trademark owners can proffer a procompetitive justifica-
tion for the contract.2 70 A valid justification must adduce some bene-
fit to consumer welfare in the form of decreased price, increased
output, or an increase in the quality of output.271 In this case, how-
ever, no such justification exists.
Consumer welfare does not benefit from these injunctions because
they allow the trademark owner to control the most efficient part of
the market in which most consumers operate. This, in turn, allows the
trademark owner to raise prices, decrease outputs, or decrease the
quality of outputs because the consumer is cut off from any competi-
tive information that would otherwise prevent the trademark owner
from inflating its price.272 As a result, consumer welfare is harmed. 273
Although not framing their analysis around antitrust laws, the ma-
jority of circuit courts disagree, arguing that consumers benefit from
the procompetitive justification of quickly finding and purchasing the
goods of the trademark owner.274 But the majority has entirely ig-
nored the class of consumers who use search engines to find substi-
tutes for similar products.2 75 In granting the injunctions, the majority
has not only preferred one class of consumers over another,276 but it
has also reduced the overall availability of competitive information
that benefits all consumers. 277
Trademark owners may proffer another justification for the injunc-
tion: the injunction allows the trademark owner to experience an in-
crease in sales. 278 However, this increase in sales directly correlates
with the decrease in competition from non-trademark rivals, and any
justification that rests on a pure desire to lessen competition is not an
adequate justification.279 Holding in the alternative amounts to
"nothing less than a frontal assault on the basic policy of the Sherman
Act."2 80
270. See supra notes 248-249 and accompanying text.
271. Cf. Jacobson, supra note 109, at 344 (explaining that the defendants in Visa failed to offer
an adequate justification because they could not demonstrate how consumers benefited from the
exclusive dealing contract).
272. See id. at 328 (noting that firms with a large enough market share can unduly raise prices,
decrease outputs, or engage in other acts that harm consumer welfare).
273. See id.; supra notes 222-237 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 213-221 and accompanying text.
275. See Grynberg, supra note 185, at 60 (stating that some courts have given "short shrift to
the interests of nonconfused consumers who may have a stake in the defendant's conduct").
276. See id.
277. See supra notes 183-186, 213-221 and accompanying text.
278. Cf Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 693 (1978).
279. See id. at 695.
280. Id.
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Given that trademark owners cannot offer a procompetitive justifi-
cation that aids consumer welfare, these injunctions are inappropriate
because, in effect, they over-enforce trademark law while crippling
competition. Such conduct harms consumer welfare because it sub-
jects uninformed consumers to the mercy of self-serving trademark
owners. Moreover, in reaching a holding that undermines antitrust
laws, the majority has inappropriately expanded the Lanham Act into
an instrument that devalues antitrust objectives. Given the nascent
development of online competition, courts should strive to remedy
this holding before it destroys the integrity and efficiency of e-
commerce.
IV. IMPACT
While the use of trademarks in metatags and sponsored links con-
tinues to spawn intense debate, the majority of circuit courts that have
heard these debates have imposed grave consequences upon all online
consumers. One such consequence includes the overall reduction of
online information, and consequently, an overall reduction in the
functionality and efficiency of the Internet.281 If the holdings of these
courts are not reversed, the lack of online information threatens to
subject consumers to the will of sellers who dominate the market. 282
In addition to limiting the efficiency of e-commerce, the majority's
holdings also limit the Internet's ability to generate social benefits. 283
In order to prevent the demise of these new societal advantages, these
courts must abandon their holdings. Furthermore, as the law stands
today, e-commerce precedent threatens to undermine online antitrust
regulations.2 84
This Part articulates the impact of the majority's and minority's
holdings. 285 Section A demonstrates the necessity of information in a
competitive market and the dangers that correlate with a reduced and
controlled supply of information. 286 Section B explores the demise of
social benefits that are likely to accompany the majority's holdings.287
Finally, Section C discusses the appropriate role of trademark law and
the consequence that the majority's holding imposes upon antitrust
law. 28
8
281. See infra notes 289-301 and accompanying text.
282. See id.
283. See infra notes 302-311 and accompanying text.
284. See infra notes 310-311 and accompanying text.
285. See infra notes 289-311 and accompanying text.
286. See infra notes 289-301 and accompanying text.
287. See infra notes 302-309 and accompanying text.
288. See infra notes 310-311 and accompanying text.
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A. The Majority's Rule Threatens to Undermine the
Functionality of the Internet
Information is vital to a well-functioning, competitive market be-
cause information creates well-informed consumers. 289 Informed con-
sumers, in turn, force companies to offer goods at the lowest price
because an informed consumer will simply purchase a competing good
if a rival fails to offer a satisfactory product at a satisfactory price.290
Thus, informed consumers promote competition within markets.2 91
Without information, however, consumers remain unaware of compet-
ing products, decreased prices, or increased quality.2 92 This lack of
information hampers the consumer's ability to purchase the most sat-
isfactory product.2 93 Moreover, when consumers remain unaware of
competing goods, sellers who dominate the market have no incentive
to lower prices or increase the quality of their goods.294 Conse-
quently, while an abundance of information promotes competitive
markets, a lack of information entrenches market dominance and
stagnates consumer satisfaction.
Anyone connected to the Internet can post content on a website
and make it available to others.2 95 But the ease of posting content on
the Internet has created an information overflow that requires some
sort of mechanism that can select and sort relevant information from
the large bulks of available data.2 96 To date, search engines are the
only devices that serve this function.297 Because of the Internet's in-
formation overflow and the resultant necessity of search engines, if
information on the Web does not appear on a search engine's result
pages, that information is effectively nonexistent. 298 Consequently,
control over a search engine's result pages effectively gives the con-
troller "a power to filter information. ' 299 This power is substantial,
and if placed in the hands of those with conflicting interests, it can be
greatly abused.
289. See Weiser, supra note 237, at 290-91 (demonstrating the importance of informed con-






295. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 233, at 180.
296. See id.
297. See id.
298. Id. at 180-81
299. Id. at 181.
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Moreover, by enjoining competitors from using trademarked words
in metatags or from purchasing sponsored links, the majority of courts
have effectively allowed trademark owners to control online informa-
tion.300 To illustrate, when a trademark owner demands and receives
an injunction, its competitors are prohibited from using the most effi-
cient means of informing consumers. Thus, the trademark owner is
free to offer its product at any price and then provide a controlled
amount of information that will induce consumers into purchasing its
product. Critics of this argument may argue that the trademark owner
has not actually removed the information from the Internet, and con-
sequently, the injunction does not grant trademarks owners control
over information. But as stated above, this argument ignores the real-
ity that online information that is not retrievable through search en-
gines is virtually nonexistent. 30 1
Therefore, the majority's use of injunctive remedies enables trade-
mark owners to eradicate competitive threats from their rivals. With-
out competitors, trademark owners can bask in the glow of increased
sales at higher prices. This result is inappropriate, particularly from
an antitrust perspective, because it subjects uninformed online con-
sumers to the will of trademark owners.
B. The Demise of the Internet's Functionality May
Destroy Social Advantages
The rise and popularity of the Internet has created unexpected so-
cial benefits. These benefits include a search engine's ability to pro-
vide instructive statistical data, as well as the search engine's ability to
facilitate medical advancements. 30 2
Since the search engine's creation, Internet users have come to trust
the search engine's ability to provide an abundance of relevant infor-
mation. 30 3 Especially among younger generations, individuals often
feel more comfortable turning to the Internet for information, as op-
posed to offline resources, such as the yellow or white pages.304 The
wide-spread use and familiarity with search engines have rendered
them a source of valuable information. For instance, the New York
Times frequently cites the most searched terms on Google as evidence
300. See generally supra note 67 (listing cases consistent with the majority's interpretation).
301. See Lastowka, supra note 8, at 1332; see also supra notes 272-277 and accompanying text
(explaining that Internet users do not benefit from the injunction).
302. See infra notes 303-309 and accompanying text.
303. See Lastowka, supra note 8, at 1337 ("Google has become, for the majority of Americans,
the index of choice for online information.").
304. See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. REV.
1027, 1032-37 (2008) (describing the role that digital technology plays in an adolescent's life).
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of an event's popularity or importance.30 5 This data is useful because
it provides social scientists with an opportunity to compare and con-
trast the interests of differing cultures or countries. 30 6 Therefore, the
abundance of relevant information that renders search engines useful
also creates indirect benefits in the form of analytical data.
Surprisingly, a study of the most searched terms on search engines
has led to advancements in the medical field. For example, a recent
study revealed that that flu-related search terms increase in popularity
during the flu season.307 After relaying this information to the Cen-
ters for Disease Control (CDC), the CDC is now able to identify flu
epidemics two weeks earlier than traditionally possible.30 8 Conse-
quently, Google search terms aid the medical community by serving as
an early warning system that enables the CDC to act with more
speed.30 9 Therefore, the abundance of relevant information on the In-
ternet renders search engines useful as both analytical and medical
tools.
If, however, the Internet user's ability to find information continues
to decrease, as it does pursuant to the injunctive remedy that is fa-
vored by the majority, the functionality of the Internet will also de-
crease. Internet users will undoubtedly perceive the Internet's
decrease in efficiency and functionality, and this perception will re-
duce the Internet user's trust in search engines. Consequently, In-
ternet users may turn to other offline sources in order to gain relevant
information. This decrease in a search engine's utility places the
above-illustrated social advantages in peril because the most searched
terms will no longer represent an Internet user's thoughts and con-
cerns; instead, the search terms will only represent the information
that an Internet user believes the search engine can find. Moreover,
given that these social advantages have risen with the bourgeoning
growth of the Internet, one can only imagine the number of unknown
future social advantages that will never be realized if the majority con-
tinues to restrict online information.
305. See, e.g., Ellen Bravo, Letter to the Editor, For Paid Sick Days, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14,
2008, at A32; Jascha Hoffman, PubMed, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 30, 2008, at F2.; Daniel Sorid, Writing
the Web's Future in Numerous Languages, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2008, at B1; Pete Thamel, Tebow
Returning to Florida for Final Year, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2009, at D7.
306. Cf Katherine V.W. Stone, Flexibilization, Globalization, and Privatization: Three Chal-
lenges to Labour Rights in Our Time, 44 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 77, 90 (2006) (explaining how the
Internet can be used as an instrument to keep different cultures alive and distinct).
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C. The Majority's Holding Threatens to Compromise
Antitrust Laws
The majority has over-enforced trademark law in a manner that en-
croaches upon antitrust regulations. Specifically, the majority's hold-
ings diminish the influence of antitrust laws within e-commerce
because the injunctive remedy is so restrictive that it undermines com-
petition.310 If the majority continues to adhere to a legal theory that
conflicts with antitrust laws, the role of antitrust within e-commerce
will become increasingly marginalized. This marginalization is unac-
ceptable because "[i]ntellectual property rights do not confer a privi-
lege to violate the antitrust laws. '311
Unfortunately, the true impact of the majority's holdings remains
unknown. It seems most likely that the most beneficial and produc-
tive uses of the Internet have yet to be discovered. The majority's
approach, therefore, threatens the potential growth and efficiency of
the Internet.
V. CONCLUSION
"Misuse of courts and governmental agencies is a particularly effec-
tive means of delaying or stifling competition. " 312
The enforcement of trademark law necessarily restrains trade, and
therefore, courts should inquire whether the enforcement of trade-
mark law will excessively restrain trade in a manner that conflicts with
antitrust laws. 313 This Comment illustrates that such an inquiry leads
to the conclusion that the majority of circuits have inappropriately in-
terpreted the Lanham Act.314
An analysis into the plain meaning and purpose of Lanham Act in-
dicates that a competitor can legally use its rival's trademark in
metatags and sponsored links.315 Not only do these uses fail to consti-
tute "use," as defined by the Lanham Act, but they are also unlikely
to cause consumer confusion as to the source of the good in ques-
tion.316 In addition, the holdings of the majority fails to comport with
the purpose of the Lanham Act, which aims to promote competition
by improving the quality of information relayed to consumers. 317
310. See supra notes 213-280 and accompanying text.
311. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
312. BORK, supra note 220, at 159.
313. See supra notes 213-280 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 213-280 and accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 133-182 and accompanying text.
316. See supra notes 141-182 and accompanying text.
317. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 187, at 1227.
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These arguments, however, are heatedly contested, and critics find
themselves unable to agree about the appropriate scope of trademark
law. This Comment suggests that an inquiry into antitrust law high-
lights what trademark law fails to perceive: the holdings of the major-
ity are inappropriate because they necessarily lead to injunctive
remedies that excessively restrict trade. 318
The dangers of over-enforcing trademark law cannot be disregarded
in a day and age where technology outpaces regulation. 319 Courts
should embrace a heightened awareness to this danger within the In-
ternet context because handicapping e-commerce in its nascent stage
harms consumers and sellers alike. Above all else, courts must ap-
proach Internet disputes with conservative applications of law because
the most effective way to entrench market dominance is to gain the
authority of the courts.320
Melanie C. MacKay*
318. See supra notes 213-280 and accompanying text.
319. See Bialek, supra note 213, at 10; Bonewitz, supra note 213, at 920.
320. See BORK, supra note 220, at 159.
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